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Introduction
This issue brief  provides a brief  overview of  the Emergency Medical Treat-
ment and Labor Act (EMTALA) and focuses on its application to hospital 
inpatients.  EMTALA applies differently to patients than non-patients, and also 
applies differently to patients admitted through the emergency department than 
patients admitted as regular inpatients.  In addition, courts and the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) have differed in their interpretation of  
the statute.  Depending on the specific facts of  any particular case, EMTALA 
may or may not have implications for specialty-related transfers and discharges.   
Following an overview of  the statute and implementing regulations, the issue 
brief  analyzes the law, as well as a series of  relevant court decisions, for their 
application to hospital inpatients in emergency transfer situations. 
EMTALA: An Overview
The Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA)1  establishes a 
series of  requirements applicable to all Medicare-participating hospitals that 
have a “dedicated emergency department.”2   EMTALA was enacted to stop 
“patient dumping,” that is, the refusal to treat patients with emergencies as well 
as the premature discharge of  unstable, uninsured patients.3   The statute estab-
lishes two basic requirements, a screening requirement as well as a stabilization 
and appropriate transfer requirement:
1. In the case of  an individual who “comes to” a hospital’s emergency depart-
ment4 and on whose behalf  “a request is made” for examination or treatment,5   
the hospital must provide for an “appropriate medical screening examination 
within the capability of  the hospital’s emergency department to determine 
whether or not an emergency medical condition . . . exists.”6  
2. If  any individual “comes to a hospital and the hospital determines that the 
individual has an emergency medical condition, the hospital must provide 
either –“(i) [w]ithin the capabilities of  the staff  and facilities available at the 
hospital, for further medical examination and treatment as required to stabi-
lize the medical condition [or] (ii) [f]or transfer of  the individual to another 
medical facility”7  in accordance with the terms of  the Act. 
Judicial and Agency Interpretation of  EMTALA’s Meaning in the Context 
of  Hospital Inpatients 
Since its enactment, EMTALA has generated a great deal of  litigation about where 
in a hosptial setting the law applies and to which patients.  It is important to 
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understand that a court can only define the law within its geographic jurisdictional region; until the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court has spoken, no single decision represents a definitive interpretation of  federal 
law.  Thus, conflicting court decisions could mean that EMTALA is applied differently across the country.  
Furthermore, while federal regulations can help clarify and standardize conduct, courts actually have the 
power to reject an agency’s interpretation of  the law, that is, to choose not to defer to an agency inter-
pretation of  what a particular statute means.  This judicial power to reject agency interpretation of  a law 
– even when the agency interpreting the law is charged with its enforcement – has produced at least one 
significant EMTALA ruling on the law’s application to inpatients. 
Early Ambiguity
The challenge of  applying EMTALA to hospital inpatients arose relatively early.  The text of  the 
EMTALA statute8 does not define certain key terms, such as “comes to the emergency department,” nor 
does the statute specifically address EMTALA’s  relationship to patients as they may be moved through 
the hospital in the process of  being screened and stabilized.  At the same time, the impetus for EMTALA 
was the elimination of  patient dumping, both at the hospital emergency room door and prematurely out 
of  hospitals (which was referred to as releasing patients “sicker and quicker”). 
Early regulations defined the concept of  coming to the hospital as being on hospital property,9 which in 
turn invited the question whether EMTALA’s screening and/or stabilization requirements applied to 
patients who, at the time an emergency arose, were in parts of  the hospital other than the emergency 
department.  On this question, the courts reached different conclusions regarding the physical locations in 
which EMTALA would apply.
Some courts interpreted “come to the emergency department,” as meaning that that EMTALA would not 
apply to hospital inpatients, however admitted, who develop emergency conditions during the course of  
their hospital stay.  This reading was prompted by clear evidence that EMTALA was not intended to be a 
“federal malpractice statute,”10  and thus, that its requirements should not supersede laws – such as state 
malpractice law or federal Medicare conditions of  participation – which protect inpatients from profes-
sional and institutional negligence (i.e., substandard care). Under this reading, a hospital’s obligations 
under EMTALA ended upon admission as an inpatient.11  
However, as noted, EMTALA’s origins can be traced back to Congressional concerns over not only the 
failure to screen but also the premature discharge of  inpatients, perhaps worsened by the enactment of  
the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS). This history, combined with the actual text of  the 
stabilization requirement (which, as noted above, references simply coming to “a hospital” and contains no 
limiting  references focused on emergency departments) led other courts to conclude that EMTALA did 
indeed reach hospital inpatients.  
For example, in Lopez-Soto v. Hawayek,12  the First Circuit Court of  Appeals, ruling in a case brought in 
Puerto Rico, held that EMTALA applied to the case of  an infant born in the hospital’s maternity ward, 
who suffered a medical emergency shortly after birth.  The court reasoned that EMTALA’s stabilization 
and appropriate transfer requirements apply to patients who present with emergency conditions in parts 
of  the hospital other than the emergency room. The court noted the law’s emphasis on preventing patient 
dumping, which could occur anywhere in the hospital, and its specific inclusion of  women in labor, who 
were likely to present to maternity wards rather than emergency rooms.  The Lopez-Soto court’s decision 
did not turn on whether the patient was admitted as an inpatient, but rather the fact that the patient was 
in the hospital when the emergency condition arose.13   
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Recognition of  EMTALA’s reach to inpatients has been evident in decisions of  the United States Supreme 
Court as well.  In the case of  Roberts v. Galen of  Virginia,14  which involved the discharge of  an unstable 
hospital inpatient, the United States Supreme Court and lower federal courts undertook an EMTALA 
analysis even though the patient had been admitted to the hospital for six weeks prior to her transfer.   
The very fact of  the analysis suggests that the Court viewed EMTALA as pertinent to the stabilization 
of  hospital inpatients, indeed, long after the acute episode that may initially have led to the initial admis-
sion. Courts also extended EMTALA to cases in which the patient first presented to the emergency room, 
was subsequently admitted to the hospital for treatment, and was either inappropriately transferred or not 
stabilized after admission.15     
The leading case for the opposing perspective – namely that inpatient admission extinguishes hospitals’ 
stabilization requirement – is Harry v Marchant.16   In Marchant,  the United States Court of  Appeals for 
the Eleventh Circuit, relied not on the stabilization duty itself, but instead on the definition of  “to sta-
bilize” which under EMTALA means “with respect to an emergency condition. . . to provide such medi-
cal treatment  . . . as may be necessary to assure, within reasonable medical probability, that no material 
deterioration . . . is likely to result from or occur during the transfer of  the individual from a facility. . . .”17   
In the court’s view, because stabilization was a process that occurred only in relation to a transfer from the 
emergency department, persons admitted as inpatients were not covered.  The court reached this conclu-
sion even though nothing in the definition of  “to stabilize” limits transfers to those that may originate in 
an emergency department. 
The 2003 Federal Regulations
In the wake of  these conflicting court decisions, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
the agency within the United States Department of  Health and Human Services (HHS) that administers 
Medicare and Medicaid, promulgated regulations in 2003 that came down squarely on the side of  March-
ant, adopting the view that as a general rule, hospital stabilization duties end upon inpatient admission.18   
In addition to this change, the regulations made numerous other revisions designed to clarify EMTALA’s 
reach.  The regulations provide that EMTALA can apply to a person presenting on the hospital property 
seeking emergency care, even if  the location is not part of  a “dedicated emergency department.”19   Sec-
ond, the regulations define a “dedicated emergency department” to include not only the emergency room 
but also other departments in the hospital “that provide emergency or labor and delivery services, or both, 
to individuals who present as unscheduled ambulatory patients but are routinely admitted to be evaluated 
and treated.”20   Thus, the regulations clarify that EMTALA does indeed extend beyond a hospital’s emer-
gency department under certain circumstances.  
At the same time, the regulations limit the scope of  the EMTALA stabilization requirement by creating a 
specific exception to the stabilization obligation in the case of  persons admitted as inpatients.  Thus, fol-
lowing its explanation of  the general EMTALA stabilization requirement, the regulation states:21
(2) Exception: Application to inpatients. (i) If  a hospital has screened an individual under paragraph (a) 
of  this section and found the individual to have an emergency medical condition, and admits that indi-
vidual as an inpatient in good faith in order to stabilize the emergency medical condition, the hospital 
has satisfied its special responsibilities under this section with respect to that individual.
(ii) This section is not applicable to an inpatient who was admitted for elective (nonemergency) diagno-
sis or treatment.
(iii) A hospital is required by the conditions of  participation for hospitals under Part 482 of  this chapter 
to provide care to its inpatients in accordance with those conditions of  participation. 
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In its explanation of  this provision, CMS reiterated that EMTALA is not a federal malpractice statute, 
noting that “once a hospital admits an individual as [an inpatient, a] hospital has a variety of  other legal, 
licensing, and professional obligations with respect to the continued proper care and treatment of  such 
patients.”22   Therefore, under the revised regulations, a failure to stabilize an emergency condition after 
inpatient admission would not give rise to an EMTALA claim, but rather, a claim for medical negligence 
or a complaint filed against the hospital for failure to adhere to applicable Medicare Conditions of  Partici-
pation (COPs) (and by definition, Medicaid participation rights, given the link between the two laws with 
respect to conditions of  participation).23   
The CMS rule stresses that the admission must be in good faith and for the purpose of  stabilization; the 
Preamble to the rule emphasizes that a hospital can still be liable under EMTALA if  it does “not admit 
an individual in good faith with the intention of  providing treatment (that is, the hospital [uses] the 
inpatient admission as a means to avoid EMTALA requirements).”  Once the patient has been admitted in 
good faith, EMTALA no longer applies even if  the patient subsequently becomes unstable or develops a 
new emergency medical condition.24   Presumably, the burden of  proving bad faith would fall on the com-
plainant.  
  
Post-2003 Court Decisions Construing the Meaning of  EMTALA’s Stabilization Obligations
Since the 2003 regulations, most courts considering EMTALA stabilization violation claims brought by 
inpatients have rejected those claims because the individuals were inpatients.25  Two important exceptions 
to this trend are Lima-Rivera v. UHS of  Puerto Rico,26 and Moses v Providence Hospitals and Medical Center. 27  
In Lima Rivera, a pregnant woman with an emergency condition and in labor presented to a hospital’s 
emergency room and delivered a baby in the hospital’s operating room.  The infant was admitted to the 
hospital’s regular nursery as an inpatient but shortly developed an unstable emergency medical condition.  
The infant was transferred in an unstable condition to a different hospital, where he died within a day of  
the transfer.  
The court held that the plaintiffs had a case under EMTALA even though the infant had been admitted 
as an inpatient.  Relying on Lopez-Soto, the court held that the infant “presented” to the hospital when he 
was born in the operating room after a cesarean section28 and that the hospital staff  identified his emer-
gency medical condition,29 which triggered EMTALA’s stabilization and appropriate transfer requirement.  
The court did not say when the infant was admitted to the hospital’s nursery, but it appears that the 
emergency condition was detected after he was transferred to the nursery.  Thus, the court in Lima-Rivera 
applied the law’s stabilization and appropriate transfer requirement to an apparent inpatient.  Although 
this application is in conflict with the 2003 regulations, the facts of  the Lima-Rivera case happened before 
the regulations took effect, so the court specifically declined to follow them.  No court has followed Lima-
Rivera and applied EMTALA to facts that happened after the regulations took effect.   
In Moses, potentially the most important post-2003 regulation case to date, the United States Court of  
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, rejected the HHS stabilization rule out of  hand as clearly contrary to Con-
gressional intent and the statutory language of  EMTALA, in addition to finding the regulations inap-
plicable because they were enacted after the facts of  the case.  Construing the stabilization obligation, 
the court reasoned that the statute “requires more than the admission and further testing of  a patient; 
it requires that actual care, or treatment, be provided as well.  Accordingly, Defendants could not satisfy 
their EMTALA obligations merely by screening [the patient] and admitting him to conduct further test-
ing.”30   The court also reasoned that EMTALA’s requirement that the hospital determine that the patient 
has actually stabilized before release “would be unnecessary if  a hospital only needed to admit the patient 
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in order to satisfy EMTALA.”31   Therefore, the court declined to follow the HHS rule that admission sat-
isfies EMTALA’s stabilization requirement and concluded that under the statute, a hospital is required to 
actually stabilize the patient, not merely admit the patient for stabilization, so the hospital could be liable 
under EMTALA for failing to stabilize a patient who had been admitted as an inpatient.
Other cases have adhered to the HHS rule.  In Morgan v. North Mississippi Medical Center,32  the EMTALA 
stabilization protections were invoked by an individual who suffered various injuries due to a fall, was 
rushed to the hospital in an ambulance, received emergency trauma care, and was admitted as an inpatient.  
The hospital informed the patient’s wife that she would have to make financial arrangements to pay for 
his care and attempted to discharge him several times.  Nine days after his admission, he was discharged 
and an ambulance controlled by the hospital took him home, where he died 12 hours later from untreated 
injuries related to his original fall.  The court concluded that the facts showed evidence that the admission 
was not in “good faith” as required under the rule, but ultimately found that the evidence failed to docu-
ment bad faith conduct by the hospital.33  Other cases also followed the HHS stabilization rule, including: 
Anderson v. Kindred Hosp.;34  Benitez-Rodriguez v. Hosp. Pavia Hato Rey, Inc.;35  Estate of  Haight v. Robert-
son;36  Preston v. Meriter Hospital, Inc.;37  and Prickett v. Hot Spring County Med. Ctr.38 
The Special Case of  Newborns under EMTALA
The preceding discussion underscores the variable outcomes that can arise in the case of  infants born 
in Medicare-participating hospitals to mothers who are in locations other than the emergency depart-
ment (e.g., a hospital birthing center, an inpatient operating room).  A baby delivered in an emergency 
department with an emergency condition clearly would be covered by EMTALA. But the situation is 
less clear in the case of  infants born in hospital birthing centers (for example, would a birthing center be 
considered to hold itself  out as a dedicated emergency department with regard to its ability to manage a 
birth, including a birth that rapidly developed into an emergency?). The regulations would seem to deny 
EMTALA protections to infants born to mothers who are inpatients, but the courts seem to be unsettled 
about how to deal with the rules.  
The Impact of  the Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of  2002 on EMTALA
The Born-Alive Infants Protection Act of  200239  (BAIPA) is a federal law that defines the terms “individ-
ual”40  and “born alive”41  for the purpose of  interpreting and applying all federal laws, including EMTA-
LA.  BAIPA’s purpose is to ensure that infants that are expelled or extracted from their mothers at any 
stage of  development are treated as living beings if  they have “a beating heart, pulsation of  the umbilical 
cord, or definite movement of  the voluntary muscles.”42  
In 2005, CMS issued guidance regarding the effect of  BAIPA on EMTALA.  The guidance seeks to 
clarify those situations in which EMTALA protects an infant who is born alive as the term is used in the 
BAIPA.  The guidance notes that if  a hospital’s labor and delivery department meets the definition of  a 
“dedicated emergency department,” then EMTALA would protect the infant born or delivered in such a 
setting either if  a request were made for an emergency screening and stabilization or if  a prudent lay-
person were to conclude that based on its appearance the infant required emergency care. CMS also notes 
that EMTALA screening and stabilization duties might be triggered “elsewhere on the hospital campus 
(i.e., not in the hospital’s dedicated emergency department)” if  a “prudent layperson observer concluded, 
based on the born-alive infant’s appearance or behavior, that the born-alive infant were suffering from an 
emergency medical condition.”  This passage suggests that in contrast to the 2003 regulations, CMS con-
siders the health of  the infant to be paramount in labor and delivery cases, not the setting of  the care.  If  
a prudent layperson were to recognize the need for screening and stabilization, the duty would attach 
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regardless of  where on the campus the birth occurred.  While the guidance also notes that once the infant 
is transferred to inpatient care, EMTALA protections cease, the initial screening and stabilization duties 
may be applicable anywhere on a hospital campus. 
Conflicting Opinions Regarding Newborn Inpatient Status
The court in Lopez-Soto appeared to consider the newborn to be a new patient presenting to the hospital 
with an emergency condition.43  The court in Lima-Rivera also found that that the baby presented to the 
hospital independently from his mother when he was born in the hospital’s operating room.44  In contrast, 
the Wisconsin court in Preston v. Meriter Hospital, Inc.45 held that EMTALA did not apply to an infant 
born with an emergency condition because the infant was deemed an inpatient by virtue of  its mother’s 
admission as an inpatient.  The court in Preston concluded that since the mother was admitted as an inpa-
tient while in labor at the birthing center, the baby was automatically an inpatient as well.46  Therefore, 
under the inpatient exception from the 2003 regulations, EMTALA did not apply.  (The Preston court 
did not reference the 2005 CMS guidance regarding BAIPA or the conflicting analysis in Lopez-Soto and 
Lima-Rivera on the issue of  the infant’s inpatient status.)  
2008 Federal Regulations
Further complicating the picture, in April 2008, CMS proposed new regulations concerning EMTALA’s 
application to inpatients.47  Although CMS reiterated that EMTALA obligations end when a hospital that 
detected an emergency medical condition admits the patient in order to provide necessary treatment for 
that condition, it also stated a belief  that “the obligation of  EMTALA does not end for all hospitals once 
an individual has been admitted as an inpatient to the hospital where the individual first presented.”48  
Rather, CMS proposed that if  a hospital attempts to transfer an admitted patient to another hospital with 
specialized capabilities, the receiving hospital has an obligation under EMTALA to accept the transfer if  
it has the capacity to treat the person, regardless of  the person’s inpatient status.  
CMS received many comments opposed to this proposal because of  the potential burden that would inure 
to specialty hospitals that would find themselves in a position of  having to accept inpatient transfers.  Ulti-
mately in its final rule,49  CMS did not adopt its own proposal and instead remained firm in the position that 
EMTALA obligations end once a patient is admitted in good faith to treat an emergency condition, and thus, 
that a hospital with specialized capabilities has no EMTALA obligation to accept the transfer of  an inpa-
tient of  another hospital.  Hospitals with specialized capabilities continue to have an obligation to accept the 
transfer of  patients held in emergency departments and in need of  emergency specialized care.50   The final 
rule was published in the Federal Register on August 19, 2008 and went into effect on October 1, 2008. 
This final position was reaffirmed by recent Interpretive Guidelines released by CMS on March 6, 2009.  
The guidelines state (emphasis in original):51 
[O]nce an individual is admitted in good faith to the admitting hospital, the admitting hospital has 
satisfied its EMTALA obligation with respect to that individual, even if  the individual remains unstabi-
lized, and a hospital with specialized capabilities does NOT have an EMTALA obligation to accept an 
appropriate transfer of  that individual.  However, it is important to note that this rule does not apply to 
individuals who are protected under EMTALA and placed in observation status rather than admitted as 
inpatients.  These individuals are outpatients.  
Thus, in the absence of  bad faith, the federal government considers EMTALA to end at the point of  inpa-
tient admission. 
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However, it is important to note that despite CMS’s interpretation of  EMTALA, courts may disagree 
with that interpretation and impose liability under EMTALA based on their own interpretation of  the 
law.  The Moses case, discussed above, is the most recent example of  this. 52   In that case, the U.S. Court 
of  Appeals for the Sixth Circuit specifically rejected the defendants’ reliance on the 2003 CMS regulation, 
stating that the regulation was promulgated after the facts occurred and, more significantly, that the CMS 
regulation was contrary to the statutory language of  EMTALA and Congressional intent.53  This ruling 
further confuses the EMTALA liability landscape for hospitals.
Where Does All of  This Leave Hospitals?
Under the most recent CMS regulations, as well as most courts, EMTALA does not apply to hospital 
inpatients, whether admitted because of  an emergency or for a non-emergency (i.e., scheduled) procedure, 
as long as the admission occurs in good faith.  Therefore, hospitals seeking to transfer inpatients could not 
invoke their stabilization and appropriate transfer rights under EMTALA.  In addition, while a receiving 
hospital has an obligation to accept an appropriate transfer of  an emergency department or ambulance 
patient, such a hospital does not have an obligation to accept an appropriate transfer of  an inpatient.54   
Thus, if  a patient is admitted as an inpatient, that admission determines not only the obligations of  the 
admitting hospital under EMTALA but also the obligations of  other hospitals where the patient might 
be transferred.  Of  course, state law may obligate specialty facilities to accept certain inpatient transfers, 
even if  EMTALA does not.  
These CMS rules may create a new type of  health care quality challenge.  Hospitals may attempt to hold 
patients in emergency departments instead of  admitting them as inpatients in order to preserve the facil-
ity’s ability to transfer an unstable patient.  In doing so, the originating hospital could face liability under 
both EMTALA and malpractice law for failure to properly stabilize a patient (in the case of  EMTALA, 
the duty is absolute; in the case of  malpractice liability, the issue would focus on the professional standard 
of  institutional care when dealing with a unstable patient with the type of  emergency medical condition 
in question).  This practice would also exacerbate ED crowding. 
If, on the other hand, the originating hospital admits the patient in order to diagnose and/or stabilize him 
or her but cannot do so, the obligations of  the transfer facility are extinguished, yet the originating hospi-
tal may face medical negligence or COP charges for substandard care in its efforts to admit and stabilize.  
Children more likely adversely affected under this scenario as many hospitals lack sub-specialty services 
needed to deal with complex injury and illness in the very young. 
It is also worth noting that courts show unease with the stabilization rule.  If  additional courts follow the 
lead of  the Court of  Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Moses, discussed above, then an inpatient admission 
will not extinguish the EMTALA obligations of  either the originating or the transfer hospital, regardless 
of  what the rules say.  
The bottom line is that hospitals must be aware that the law is unsettled here.  Admitting a patient may, 
if  the CMS rules are presumed to apply, affect the rights of  the patient and the obligations of  the receiv-
ing hospital if  a transfer is necessary. Not attempting an inpatient stabilization prior to transfer may open 
up the originating hospital to both EMTALA and medical liability, and yet avoiding admission becomes 
urgent under the EMTALA rules if  the originating hospital is to maintain any federally protected trans-
fer options to a specialty facility.  
 Consider a hypothetical child who comes to the emergency room of  a community hospital with a parent 
reporting that the child has seizures.  After appropriate screening, it is determined that the seizures 
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present an emergency condition and the child is unstable, but that the  child may have an underlying 
medical condition causing the seizure disorder and may require specialty pediatric neurology and diag-
nostic services that are not available at the community hospital.  If  the community hospital recognizes 
the potential for a complex underlying condition and thus seeks to transfer the child to a hospital with 
the necessary specialized capabilities for stabilization and treatment, the specialty hospital will have an 
EMTALA obligation to accept a medically appropriate transfer and stabilize the child upon arrival.55   If, 
on the other hand, the community hospital admits the child as an inpatient in order to fully diagnose the 
etiology of  the seizures to be able to appropriately stabilize the child,  then the specialty hospital will have 
no obligation to accept a subsequent transfer under EMTALA in federal circuits that adhere to the CMS 
standard, but may be obligated in those judicial circuits that, like the Sixth Circuit, have found the stan-
dard to be contrary to the statute and to Congressional intent.  
Community and specialty hospitals can help ease this dilemma by developing protocols governing patient 
transfers both before and after inpatient admission.  Clearly, the paramount issue is the well-being of  the 
child, not whether or how the two hospitals will share liability and payment for stabilization and treat-
ment. Advance protocols that address certain common types of  emergency situations such as respira-
tory illnesses, traumatic injury, and other conditions requiring surgical intervention would seem highly 
warranted so that community hospitals can be better guided in their medical judgments as to whether to 
attempt an inpatient admission and stabilization prior to transfer or, alternatively, to allow the transfer to 
rapidly take place prior to admission.  Such agreements would serve a second purpose as well, since they 
would be evidence of  carefully developed treatment protocols representing the professional standard of  
care and could, in a liability situation, serve as evidence of  appropriate professional conduct in addressing 
what might be life-and-death matters.  
1 Title IX of  the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1985 (COBRA), Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 912(b), 100 Stat. 82, 164 
(1986) adding Section 1867 to the Social Security Act.  (Codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395dd (1992 and Supp. 1997)).  The acronym 
EMTALA comes from the original name of  the legislation, the “Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act.”  The word “active” 
was subsequently removed from the title.   Sec. 6211(h)(2), Pub. L. No. 101-239, The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of  1989.  The text 
of  the law can be found codified as Section 1867 of  the Social Security Act in the United States Code under the heading “Examination and 
Treatment for Emergency Medical Conditions and Women in Labor.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2008).  Implementing regulations can be found in 
the Code of  Federal Regulations at 42 CFR § 489.24 et seq.
2 42 U.S.C. §1395dd(a) (1). Federal regulations interpreting the statute,  42 CFR § 489.24(a), define the term “dedicated emergency depart-
ment” as:
[A]ny department or facility of  the hospital, regardless of  whether it is located on or off  the main hospital campus, that meets at least one 
of  the following requirements: 
(1) It is licensed by the State in which it is located under applicable State law as an emergency room or emergency department; 
(2) It is held out to the public (by name, posted signs, advertising, or other means) as a place that provides care for emergency medical 
conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a previously scheduled appointment; or 
(3) During the calendar year immediately preceding the calendar year in which a determination under this section is being made, based on 
a representative sample of  patient visits that occurred during that calendar year, it provides at least one-third of  all of  its outpatient visits 
for the treatment of  emergency medical conditions on an urgent basis without requiring a previously scheduled appointment.
3 68 Fed. Reg. 53223 (September 9, 2003) (citing EMTALA’s legislative history at H.R. Rept. No. 99-241, Part I, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985), 
p.27.).
4
 The regulations clarify that “comes to” the emergency department means that a person who is not already a  patient (inpatient or outpa-
tient):
(1) Has presented at a hospital’s dedicated emergency department, as defined in this section, and requests examination or treatment for a 
medical condition, or has such a request made on his or her behalf. In the absence of  such a request by or on behalf  of  the individual, a 
request on behalf  of  the individual will be considered to exist if  a prudent layperson observer would believe, based on the individual’s ap-
pearance or behavior, that the individual needs examination or treatment for a medical condition;
(2) Has presented on hospital property, as defined in this section, other than the dedicated emergency department, and requests examina-
tion or treatment for what may be an emergency medical condition, or has such a request made on his or her behalf. In the absence of  such 
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(3) [is in an ambulance for purposes of  receiving emergency medical examination and treatment at the hospital (see regulation for addi-
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42 CFR § 489.24(b) (2008).
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